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1 Introduction
Geography's ethical turn has highlighted fundamental moral questions that shape, and
are shaped by, relations between people and places (Proctor and Smith, 1999). Building
on this, geographers have examined how ethical issues saturate our relations with
nonhuman worlds (Jones, 2000), including work on practices of production and con-
sumption that serve to either distance or bring together actors and the object of ethical
concern (Barnett et al, 2002; Whatmore, 1997). This in turn has been recognised to
have implications for the ethics of conducting geographical research. Both Dyer and
Demeritt (2009) and Boden et al (2009) have written critically about the risks of
adopting medical-style ethical review processes and procedures in the social sciences.
These processes ``reduce and codify ethics into sets of highly scripted rules, procedures
and behaviours'' and rely on regulatory ethical bodies that are remote from the
research process (Boden et al, 2009, page 734), thereby failing to address the subjective
and contextual nature of many ethical decisions undertaken in social research. Here we
ask whether the same critique could apply to the formal ethical review procedures used
in medical research. Might not subjective and contextual decisions become a part of
medical and clinical research practice? What are the implications of governing clinical
experiments through review procedures largely sited elsewhere?
Here we respond to these questions by asking how insights from social science and
animal welfare that emphasise the situated and contingent nature of ethical practice
could inform work in medical and clinical research. We identify some intriguing
synergies between work in geography, which draws on nonrepresentational theory as
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We show how the bioethical debates around the use of human subjects tend to focus on issues of
consent and language, while recent work in animal welfare reflects an increasing focus on the affectual
dimensions of ethical practice. We argue that this attention to the more-than-representational dimen-
sions of ethics and welfare might be equally important for human subjects. We assert that paying
attention to these somatic sensibilities can offer insights into how experimental environments can
both facilitate and restrict the development of more care-full and response-able relations between
researchers and their experimental subjects.
doi:10.1068/d17109a resource for developing more affective ethical geographies (Popke, 2009), animal
welfare science (Baumans, 2005; Buchanan-Smith et al, 2005), and the philosophy of
science and biophilosophy (Acampora, 2006; Despret, 2004; Haraway, 2008). These
synergies offer a starting point for bringing geography into conversation with the
discipline of bioethics. Using these approaches, we critically engage with the ways in
which ethics and welfare are conceptualised and practised within medical research,
providing further evidence of how science intervenes in relations between human and
animal bodies. This work therefore builds on earlier studies of the ways in which
relations between nature and society and space are reconfigured through practices,
such as animal conservation and trade (Whatmore, 2002), xenotransplantion (Davies,
2006), genetic-based livestock breeding programmes (Holloway, 2005); and practices of
biosecurity (Braun, 2007; Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008).
2 Ethics, welfare, and experimental subjects
The use of human and animal subjects to research, develop, and test new drugs
and clinical interventions is fundamental to the advancement of medical research and
practice, at least until viable replacements are found. Equally important are the ethical
guidelines and welfare protocols that shape the conduct of such research. These guide-
lines and protocols mark the interface between the experimental needs of medical and
scientific researchers and the socially acceptable degree of suffering the experimental
subjects should endure and/or consent to for research benefits. However, there is a
marked distinction between human phase regulations, which focus on issues of patient
recruitment and consent, and the laboratory animal phase that focuses on the `three
Rs' of reduction, refinement, and replacement.
A range of legislative measures governs UK research involving human subjects,
including the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations (2004) and the
European Union Clinical Trials Directive (2001). In addition, funding and professional
research bodies issue their own guidelines for the conduct of clinical research, such as
the Medical Research Council's clinical trials tool kit (MRC, 1998). These texts lay
down the principles for the ethical recruitment of and use of human subjects for
research. Within these ethical protocols and guidelines, there is a strong focus on the
human ability for language and rational communication. It is the capacity of human
subjects to give `informed consent' which is seen to mark out the key distinction between
the ethical treatment of human and animal subjects (MRC, 2005, page 4). Correspond-
ingly, bioethical debate also tends to focus on the underlying principles that shape the
use and recruitment of human(1) volunteers and associated codes and procedures, such
as ethical review and informed consent. See, for example, bioethical analyses of
informed consent procedures (Boulton and Parker, 2007; Dawson, 2003; Hoeyer,
2003), the use of placebo (Ehni and Wiesing, 2008); the use of inducements to recruit
participants (Edwards, 2006); equipoise (Ashcroft, 1999), and balancing patient risk
against the benefit to society (van Ness, 2001). Social scientists and anthropologists
have also begun to question the autonomy of volunteers' decision-making processes,
arguing that wider social, political, and economic conditions influence a decision to
join or refuse participation in a clinical trial (Petryna, 2006; Rajan, 2007).
Conversely, for animal subjects it is their inability to speak, but an ever-increasing
sensitivity to their ability to suffer, that has shaped ethical protocols and popular anti-
vivisectionist campaigning and protest. Animal welfare guidelines and legislation still
emphasise Russell and Burch's (1959) `three Rs': reduction (of the number of animals
used), refinement (of testing procedures to minimise suffering), and replacement
(1) In the work we have reviewed so far bioethics has focused on the use of human (as opposed to
nonhuman animal) materials, subjects, and interests in scientific research.
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Vorstenbosch, 2005). Increasingly, however, these are being supplemented by an
emphasis on the welfare of animals within the laboratory environment, driven by the
European Community's 1997 Amsterdam Treaty protocol, which desires ``improved
protection and respect for the welfare of sentient beings''. There is an assumption that
good welfare is beneficial to both the experiment and the animal and, conversely,
that ``unhappy mice give bad information'' (O'Hanlon, 2001). In contrast to the human
bioethical focus on language and informed consent, the animal welfare literature focuses
on the practicalities of following ethical protocols [although see Dyer (2004) on
the practice of lay participant involvement in research ethics committees]. Animal
welfare practitioners (unable to use language to communicate with their research
subjects) are using welfare assessments to attend to bodily practices and sensations
that are a somatic response to the day-to-day experience of being an experimental
subject.
This emphasis on more-than-verbal forms of communication is an interest shared
by both animal welfare scientists and those working with animals and a number of
contemporary geographers and social theorists. Recent research in geography and
social theory has been interested in how bodies shape our relations with the world
(Butler and Parr, 1999; Grosz, 1995; Longhurst, 1997; Nast and Pile, 1998) and other
sentient species within it (Acampora, 2006; Despret, 2004; Lorimer, 2006; Lorimer,
2007). Drawing on nonrepresentational theory (Dewsbury, 2000; 2003; Thrift, 2008),
geographers have explored how emotions and feelings shape spaces and encounters in
ways that cannot easily be captured by the tools of language and text (Anderson, 2006;
Harrison, 2007). McCormack's (2003) empirical account of a dance movement therapy
class shows how ethics and emotion may be expressed not through language but
through affectual registers, including touch, gesturing hands, and bodily movement
[see also Paterson (2005) on the use of therapeutic touch in Reiki massage]. Lea's
(2009) analysis of the teaching of Thai yoga massage leads her to stress the corporeal
as well as cultural contexts of learning an embodied skill. This work is characterised by
an emphasis on bodies, the affectual or nonrepresentational kinds of relations they
perform, and of particular relevance to our concerns here, how those relations inform
emotional responses and practices which generate particular spaces of care. Health
geographers, too, have argued that the body plays a key role in shaping our relations
with biomedical science (Hall, 2000; Parr, 2002). Here we suggest it is not just human
bodies which should be taken into account. Experimental practices in both human and
animal research are changing relations between human and animal bodies (Birke et al,
2007; Despret, 2004; Franklin, 2007; Haraway, 2008). Animal welfareöwith its shared
interest in more-than-verbal, or nonrepresentational, forms of engagement between
bodiesömight therefore offer some interesting insights for geographers concerned
with how relations between researchers and their human subjects may also be shaped
by affectual and embodied communications and registers.
Our analysis draws on preliminary work exploring how a situated, affectual, and
embodied ethics plays out in two related research arenas: clinical trials and animal
experimentation. Sources include interviews and informal discussions with experts in
bioethics, clinical trials and animal welfare, formal legislative and regulatory docu-
ments on the protocols and procedures for clinical trials and animal testing, and a
review of the related literature in the fields of bioethics and animal welfare. In the
following section, we begin by drawing on research from the fields of nursing and
medical sociology, which highlights some of the implications of focusing on an ethics
grounded in language and formal procedures and paying less attention to the everyday
processes of care. We seek to contrast the formal linguistic codes and practices of
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(Whatmore, 1997) `situated' ethics (Greenhough, 2007) that emerges from affectual,
embodied understandings of human and nonhuman relations. We are working towards
an ethics that is ``less about dour denouncements of injustice or sober analyses of
normative principles and more about enhancing, and celebrating, our immersion in
Being'' (Popke, 2009, page 81). We then compare the care practices of clinical trial
nurses with recent work in animal welfare. We suggest that the current emphasis on
the welfare of animal subjects is highlighting somatically sensitive relationships
between researchers and researched, redefining what might be seen as response-able
research practice. The final sections argue that current understandings of ethical
practice in research with both humans and animals may be reconfigured and enhanced
though an emphasis on somatic sensibilities and the spaces of welfare and day-to-day
care they inscribe. We also note some of the limitations and challenges of this
approach.
3 Situating ethics in clinical trials
The ethics of clinical trials involving human subjects have long been a focus of debate
and research within bioethics. Since the Nuremburg trials (1945^46) and the first
Declaration of Helsinki (1964), the process of recruiting volunteers for medical and
clinical research has become increasingly regulated (Dyer and Demeritt, 2009). In the
UK, trial participation procedures are enacted through a network of local and multi-
centre research ethics committees. These committees establish whether the potential
benefits of a medical trial are worth the risk to the human subjects recruited and
whether the correct procedures and protocols are in place to ensure the ethical recruit-
ment of volunteers and volunteers' welfare during the experimental process [for an
overview see Dyer (2004)]. While we do not contest the importance of both ethical
review committees and procedures, and their bioethical critiques, here we suggest that
these are not the only situations within the experimental process where ethics takes
place. In the following paragraphs we draw on evidence from the nursing literature to
suggest that ethical dilemmas and responses also permeate the day-to-day practices of
running a clinical trial. Furthermore, we suggest that the kind of ethical dilemmas and
responses that arise during the process of experimenting with human subjects are
qualitatively different to the more abstract technical and moral questions currently
addressed by ethics committees and informed consent forms.
During the day-to-day running of a clinical trial a key role is played by Clinical
Research Nurses (CRNs). While there is considerable local variation in the range of
roles and tasks performed by a CRN, the UK Royal College of Nursing's (RCN)
competency framework (a tool designed to assist nurses in their continuing professional
development) identifies four key aspects of the CRN's role:
. Knowledge and understanding of the evolution of clinical research (including
regulatory and governance frameworks).
. The application of knowledge and skills in the clinical research environment
(including knowledge of research design, financial management, an understanding
of the research process, personnel management, data collection, the completion of
study documentation, and data storage).
. The ability to work within, and adhere to, the requirements of research ethics,
research governance, and legislation (including seeking ethical approval and ensuring
the confidentiality of participants).
. Understanding the principles and practice of obtaining valid informed consent
(RCN, 2008).
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and data collector, while their responsibility towards patients is subsumed under the
management of patient^public interaction as part of research governance. Patient^
public interaction includes such tasks as preparing patient information leaflets and
answering any questions the patient and members of the public may have about the
study. The list of competencies also stresses a CRN's role in facilitating ethical research
by obtaining valid informed consent, reflecting how nurses are increasingly positioned
as a kind of bioethical gatekeeper responsible for implementing ethical procedures set
out by research protocols and approved by research ethics committees. For example, the
RCN (2006) offers detailed guidance on how to obtain informed consentöthrough
the discussion (where the nurse conveys key information about the study seen as
necessary to `inform' consent), reinforcing the discussion with a written document
(patient information leaflet), and the signing of the consent form.
This emphasis on informed consent is reflected in Andersen's (2008) review of
twenty-nine (post-1992) articles on gene therapy trials in the nursing literature. She
found that where ethics and ethical training for nurses is discussed the emphasis is on
the nurse's ability to implement informed consent procedures, which oblige them to
adequately `inform' patients about the techniques involved in the study. Relatively few
authors ``emphasise the role of providing direct care during or following gene therapy''
(Andersen, 2008, pages 209^210). This emphasis on formal informed consent pro-
cedures may seem in line with ethical research, yet Fisher (2006, page 686) also
stresses that from a pharmaceutical industry perspective it is increasingly recognised
that ``informed consent can encourage patient^subject compliance'', recruitment, and
retention. At the same time the kind of ethics represented by the informed consent
processesöwhich emphasises the need for patients to choose of their own free will to
participate in researchöis only one version of ethics. As we will go on to argue, it says
little about the other roles played out by nurses in ensuring the care and welfare of
research participants. The emphasis on sensing and observing bodily responses, which
is made explicit in animal welfare assessments, remains largely hidden in accounts and
descriptions of the nurse's role in clinical trials. In this section we begin by drawing
on empirical research from the US(2) that suggests that the role set out for nurses by
the CRN competencies might conflict with nurses' own understanding of their role
as carers.We then argue that there are other aspects of nursing which need to be taken
into account when establishing what counts as ethical research practice.
Studies in the US have found that in practice many nurses have found it difficult to
adapt to the kind of `research manager' role described above. Mueller (1997) describes
how, in her study of a clinical trial for AIDS medication in the US, nurses found it
difficult working with patients without health insurance. These patients could not
afford to supplement the trial's treatment regime with private medical care and treat-
ments that could improve their care or relieve suffering. The nurses argued that the
trial should offer additional medical care to these patients as a value-added benefit of
participation. The physician investigators leading the trial disagreed, arguing that these
treatments were not part of the trial's budget and even suggested patients without
insurance should be excluded. Mueller (1997, page 67) suggests that while physician
investigators ``seek to draw the boundaries around clinical trial practice narrowly''
nurses ``view clinical trials as an extension of medical care''.
(2) We have been unable, yet, to find any similar studies of clinical trial nursing practices in the UK
which focus on balancing the nurses' vision of their role as carer with their role as manager and
data collector. We are in the process of planning empirical research to address this gap, but in the
interim the US case studies offer a useful proxy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the situations
and experiences they describe are also shared by many UK CRNs.
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particular, with these patients. The following quote is taken from one of her interviews:
``Here it's week after week, month after month, year after year .... You watch them
suffer .... You watch their lovers die of AIDS in their arms. You watch their friends
reject them.You watch them in pain.You watch them [become] physically disfigured.
These are huge, huge issues as far as how you can just do your job'' (page 68,
emphasis added).
The nurse's language reflects how her role as a research manager and data collector
seems to be in conflict with the empathetic relationship she has formed with her
patient. Fisher (2006, page 684) further notes that this kind of conflict is intensified
by the length of many trials and because, ``unlike standard medical care, coordinators
are not only allowed but encouraged to spend a significant amount of time with patient-
subjects''. The example reflects wider tensions often noted by nurses involved in clinical
trials between their role as data managers and collectors, as a kind of scientific
observer, and their need to care for their patients (Andersen, 2008; Fisher 2006;
Mueller 1997).(4) This distinction is easily recognisable in the clinical trial context as
``the inherent conflict between doing what is best for patients versus doing what is best
for scientific integrity'' (Andersen, 2008, page 210). This conflict is echoed in the
nurse's description, whereby the process of scientific observationöof watchingö
becomes infused with the frustrated need to care for the patient, to try and relieve
their suffering. Gradually this need to care becomes an impediment to `just doing your
job' in research practice. This conflict is arguably exacerbated by the increasing trends
towards the privatisation of clinical trials, where nurse coordinators have difficulty
reconciling their training as patient carers with the pharmaceutical company's central
goal of drug development (Fisher, 2006). In practice CRNs and patients alike can
struggle to separate out the research trial from patient care. Fisher cites one of the
nurse coordinators she interviewed who suggested that:
``It's just getting that thing in your head that it's not a patient^doctor or nurse
relationship. It's a participant^research [relationship] and making that clear ....
That,`Yes, you're important as an individual, but it isn't a doctor^patient relation-
ship' ... [There was a] participant we had that was doing this [study] for psoriasis.
It was unfortunate that out of the four people that have [been enrolled in the study],
he was the one [whose condition] was the worst and had been getting worseö
which was why he came in. Well, we were almost sure he got the placebo. He got
no effect .... Even though he'd read the informed consent and we'd explained it to
him, he didn't understand it well: `How would they pick me to not get the drug
when I'm so bad?' ....He still seemed a little dumbfounded by it because you're in
a medical setting, sort of .... We're doing medical tests and they're still expecting
(3) Nurse coordinators have a similar role to CRNs in the UK and are responsible for the day-to-
day running of clinical trials, ensuring the implementation of trial protocols, and undertaking data
collection and patient care.
(4) There are three key (prelicence) phases of human trials for new medical drugs and treatments.
Phase 1 human trials establish whether the drug has any negative effects, how quickly it enters and
leaves the body and what effects it has on target cells or proteins. These involve a very small
number of healthy subjects (10^20) and are usually carried out in dedicated facilities. Phase 2
human trials are used to establish how safe and effective the drug is for the intended use and
involve patients who have the condition the drug is being developed to treat. These are usually
controlled, meaning that some patients will receive the trial drug, others a placebo or existing
treatment. Phase 3 human trials (also controlled) are much more extensive evaluations of the long-
term safety and effectiveness of the drug on a wider selection of several thousand patients with the
target condition (ClinicalTrials.gov, 2007). It should be noted that the trials described here are
phase 1 and 2, although similar dilemmas arguably arise for doctors when they are asked to act as
recruiters for phase 3 clinical trials.
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otherwise'' (Coordinator B, cited in Fisher, 2006, page 684).
It is at this moment when the current ethical provision might be found wanting.
Recent work in nursing research has begun to suggest that there may be more to ethics
in nursing practice than is captured in current bioethical debates about procedures and
informed consent. Given the limitations of informed consent procedures in managing
either patient's expectations of care or CRNs' impulse to offer such care, the kind
of ethical response nurses may make towards patients in their care is unlikely to be
captured in the formal process of obtaining informed consent. This conclusion is
supported by recent research in nursing which is turning to consider the value of
notions of embodiment (Lawler, 1991) for understanding nursing practice. For example,
Gobbi (2005, page 117) describes nursing as ``an embodied, bricoleur practice where
practitioners draw on the `shards and fragments'of the situation-at-hand to resolve the
need of the individual patient for whom they care.'' Rudge (2009) in a study of a burns
unit, talks about the need to pay attention to micro-ethics, grounded in the day-to-day
interactions of patients and nurses and their embodied experiences, as well as looking
at larger bioethical debates about consent. This emphasis on embodiment draws out a
distinction between the more objective-making managerial competencies determined
by the CRN job description and the more embodied approach to care that character-
ises nursing practice. This emphasis on the role of embodied sensibilities in shaping the
relationships between nurses and their patients finds echoes in recent work within
health geography describing how landscapes of care are inscribed by the relationships
between able and less able/sick human bodies (Parr, 2002). Significantly this work
draws attention to how care ``is performed in complex conditions of materiality,
embodiment, fields of competing knowledges and social relationships'' (Dyck et al,
2005, page 181). However, the question of how to recognise and incorporate such
situated and embodied understandings of ethics and care in the guidelines for exper-
imental research practice remains, and we recognise it as an area where bioethics has
yet to develop. In the following section, we offer one route to this goal drawing on
recent work in animal welfare science.
4 Practising animal welfare: making space for somatic sensibility
Shifting species, recent work on animal ethics has moved from focusing on the rights
and wrongs of vivisection towards a more detailed consideration of the welfare of
specific kinds of experimental subjects (Birke et al, 2007). The principles of reduce,
refine, and replace (Russell and Burch, 1959) still play a key role in the ethical
evaluation of proposed animal experiments. Now, though, greater focus is being
placed on the welfare of animals within the laboratory environment, seeking to
directly address the needs of the sentient being. A welfarist position extends the
principle of refinement by paying attention to housing and husbandry, providing
environments that allow animals to express `natural' behaviour (Baumans, 2005;
Buchanan-Smith et al, 2005). In some places this has been developed into the
observation of animal behaviour and demeanour to signal their emotional state
(Wemelsfelder, 2007).
One animal welfare expert we spoke to (interview, August 2007) described how this
might play out in practice, identifying an opportunity to refine an experimental process
to reduce suffering:
``So, for example if a researcher wanted to put 200 micro litres (l) into a mouse's ear
... introdermally, well 200 l is a lot of fluid ... it doesn't seem much to us ... but for a
mouse? ... And into its ear where there is hardly any skin thickness at all.''
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scientist), who recognises the animal as a sentient living being, is often in conflict
with scientific researchers who see the body as a series of biological and chemical
systems.``I think there is a resistance from scientists to take up the three Rs recommen-
dations because they see it as not necessary, extraneous ...'', explained the informant.
There is a conflict between those who see the experiment from the perspective of
animal welfare and those who focus on the research aims and objectives.(5) This
conflict arises from different ways of knowing the experimental subject informed by
different knowledge-practices of a laboratory scientist carrying out an animal experi-
ment and those of a veterinary expert in animal welfare responsible for ensuring
animal welfare in the laboratory. For the scientific researcher, the animal is effectively
a `black box' (Latour, 1993). For the veterinary expert in animal welfare, and often
also for those tasked with the day-to-day care of the animals, the animal subject is a
being to be cared for and with which there is communication. Though it is seemingly
self-evident that a conflict of interests will arrive, close attention to how different
knowledge-practices generate different expertises for the experimental subject raises
awareness about where they do or do not complement and where the potential lies to
coalesce. This issue of how to reconcile the two roles is equally significant for clinical
trial nurses, who effectively serve as both carers and scientific observers. In both cases
we wish to ask what would need to enter the suite of knowledge-practices of the
laboratory scientist (or the CRN job description) for the communicating animal (or
the sense-able patient) to become available to him or her? In seeking to address this
question we turn now to consider in more detail the interspecies communication
performed by laboratory vets and animal caretakers.
So how is this interspecies communication practised? Our animal welfare expert
described how he began with a model of a human subject, deciding how he might feel
in the place of the animal subject, and then adjusted this representation through what
he knew about the animal's physiology, sentience, and cognitive development:
``How do you recognise when an animal is in pain or not? .... I use anthropomorphism
quite unashamedly all the time. I always put myself in the animal's position and
from that work out what I would feel if I was an animal ... and that became the
basis for most of the clinical assessments of suffering'' (interview with animal
welfare expert, August 2007).
The informant describes what he does as anthropomorphism, which initially seems
like an unpromising space in which to start. After all one of the key critiques to emerge
from a posthumanist interrogation of animal ethics is a rejection of the moral anthro-
pomorphological extension of human ethics (and representation) to animal subjects.
This is what Wolfe (2003, page xii; see also Acampora, 2006) calls ``one of the central
ironies of animal rights philosophy''. Likewise a leading edge of veterinary surgeons
argue that ``the human tendency to anthropomorphise means we miss out on animals'
real feelings and needs, with the result that we often provide them with inappropriate
housing and medical care'' (Coghlan, 2006, page 6). For this reason, some animal
welfare scientists prefer to name their practice as critical anthropomorphism. Critical
anthropomorphists draw on a combination of their ``intuitions about what is best for
an animal, based on a knowledge of ourselves and other people'', but ``tempered by
(5) Unlike the dual role played by CRNs in nursing practice, within animal research there is usually
a clearer division of labour between the laboratory vet and animal caretakers tasked with caring
for and ensuring the welfare of the research subjects and the scientific researchers tasked with
carrying out experimental protocols and collecting data.
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behaviour, and physiology (Morton et al, 1990, page 1).(6)
The critical anthropomorphist approach picks up on many aspects of animal care
and welfare (and arguably human care and welfare) which escape the more formal
codes and criteria that regulate laboratory practice.We suggest that these skills employ
what Acampora (2006, page 130) calls ``somatic sensibility'', a phenomenologically
derived compassionate concern for the other as a ``proper object or `patient' of ethical
consideration''. For Acampora these somatic sensibilities generate relations of ``symph-
ysis'',(7) a term he uses to convey ``the sense of sharing with somebody else a
somaesthetic nexus experienced through a direct or systematic (inter)relationship'',
rather than ``the more airy, psychic notion of sympathy'' (2006, page 76). The symph-
ysis relationship is ``densely physically orientated'' (page 76), available to those who
share ``physical vulnerabilityösusceptibility to injury and illness, just by virtue of being
sentient entities of animate flesh'' (page 130). In other words, for Acampora, the same
shared vulnerabilities that make animals appropriate models for predicting the effects of
drug-compounds on human subjects might also be the basis for developing more ethical
experimental relations.
It is these somatic sensibilities that enable somatic gesturesösuch as bodily com-
portments and facial expressionsöto be apprehended through shared experiences of
having a body. While not all formally taught or required,(8) these skills and capacities
play a key role in allowing the vet or animal caretaker to sense an animal's welfare
needs. Our laboratory animal welfare expert describes how those responsible for the
day-to-day care of animals: ``have incredible expertise at picking up when a mouse is
not well. They can tell when something is going wrong, when the animal is going to die,
when it's not right for some reason'' (interview, August 2007).
Animal caretakers, not unlike good stockpersons (Morton et al, 1990) serve as
transistors in the circuits of somatic sensibility, becoming experts in interbodily com-
munications, developing a repertoire of skills that supplement a generalised somatic
awareness with species-specific sensitivities developed through time spent with chick-
ens, or monkeys or mice, for example. This embodied expertise in somatic sensibilities
is what enables a `good' animal caretaker to know when something is wrong with an
animal in their care,(9) and perhaps equally enables a nurse to sense (unvoiced) unease
(6) The critical anthropomorphism term that developed in the animal welfare science literature two
decades ago is never referenced in contemporary animal studies literature in the humanities and
social sciences (eg Wolfe, Calarco, Haraway). Animal studies literature has addressed it in less
practical terms, a reason why we favour the animal science definition here.
(7) In ancient Greek it means a `state of growing together' (Seamon in Acampora, 2006, page 159).
(8) The Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC, 2007, page 7) identifies ``knowledge of animal
husbandry'', ``skills in animal husbandry'` ``Personal qualities'', ``affinity and empathy with animals,
dedication and patience'' as essential for stockmanship. Laboratory animal welfare governing
bodies to date have not identified the essentials for laboratory animal technicians, although they
may broadly be considered similar to those for stockmanship.
(9) An example of how this repertoire of skills might work in a different context is found in the
work of the animal scientist Temple Grandin, who offers a potential insight into how successful a
nonempathic, but certainly shared somatic sensibility with animals might be used to intervene in
and change the relations between humans, animals, and environments. As an autistic person,
Grandin further represents a figure who stands outside the normative Cartesian ethical subject
and is well placed to suggest alternative ways of becoming sensitive to the responses of nonhuman
others. Grandin (2006, page 201) argues that animals and autistic persons share somatic similar-
ities, including an ability to ``think without language'' by ``associating sensory-base memories such
as smells, sounds or visual images into categories'', feats of great memory, thinking in details, and a
sensitivity to tone. Her work involves drawing on her shared somatic sensibilities with animals in
redesigning abattoir environments to lessen animal stress. A third of all cattle and hogs in the US
are now handled in slaughterhouses following her designs.
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recognising more explicitly the role of somatic sensibilities in providing good care. This
work provides a starting point for thinking through how animals (and humans) might
relate and respond differently to the experimental environment, and in turn how we
might think differently about our responsibilities (defined as ethical or otherwise)
towards them.
5 Becoming articulate in experimental space
So far then, we might argue that clinical trial nurses, laboratory vets, and animal
caretakers have some things in common, an ability to sense and respond to nonverbal
as well as verbal signs of distress, discomfort, and suffering in the humans and animals
in their care. However, clinical trial nurses are seemingly constrained in their capacities
to respond to these signs by experimental protocols (which emphasise scientific objec-
tivity and informed consent), and in the US example by clinical trial budgets. Even
when caring does take placeöas it undoubtedly doesöit seemingly slips under the
radar of formal accounts and ethical procedures, as reflected in Andersen's analysis
of papers on gene therapy trials (2008). Fisher (2006) describes how for one nurse the
conflict became too much:
``In one remarkable case, a coordinator who had 14 years of experience convinced
the physician for whom she was working to stop accepting particular studies. In her
telling of this story, she had done multiple studies for several different pharmaceuti-
cal companies on cox-2 inhibitors (eg Vioxx, Celebrex, Bextra) and saw the negative
effects that this type of drug was having on patient-subjects: I finally got to the
point where I said, `No, I don't want to do these studies'. And so I had to talk to
Dr.X and say, `You know these meds? We're supposed to be here helping mankind
and these medicines aren't. They're making them worse and [causing] a lot of pain.
That's not what we're here for, so I don't want to do these studies. If you want to do
these studies, that's fine, but you'll need to find somebody else to do it for you.
Because I can't legitimately give people these medications'' (Coordinator D, cited in
Fisher, 2006, page 685).
Here it is the nurse's sense of patients' bodily discomfort and distress, rather than
the patients' verbal and written decisions to participate or not, which are informing her
(ethical) decision to no longer facilitate the study. Indications are that nurses in their
day-to-day practice are developing a range of skills that make them sensitive to
precisely the kinds of nonverbal signals (such as sensing pain) which form part of the
competencies of their counterparts in animal welfare. For example, Rudge (2009)
describes how nurses in a burn unit often have to witness injuries, pain, and suffering
which effectively render them (the nurses) inarticulate. Their response relied not on
words but on practices of care, assessing and dressing wounds and later on teaching
patients to facilitate their own care. The contexts of Fisher's and Rudge's examples
are different (clinical trial versus aftercare in a severe burns unit) and so are the
responses, a refusal to continue with a trial (Fisher) and the adoption of more
careful, skilful practices of treatment (Rudge). However, in both cases the focus is
less on abstract bioethical principles and formal consent procedures and more on the
relationships and response-abilities established between nurses and patients informed
by the experience of giving and receiving care and treatment. This emphasis on what
Rudge calls a micro-ethic of care, embodied in the skilled and careful practice of
procedures, offers a striking parallel with the earlier description of injecting a mouse's
ear. Within laboratory animal welfare, while practices of care are still constrained by
and subsumed to following experimental protocols, these kinds of somatic sensibili-
ties are taking on a much more prominent role in developing recommendations and
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practice. So, what can the emerging welfarist position offer our understanding of a
more-than-representational (Lorimer, 2005) ethics?
In the preceding sections we have argued that in order to rethink the ethics of
experimental research with sentient subjects we should not focus on what differentiates
human and animal subjectsöa focus on verbal consent. Instead, we might look
towards what human and animal subjects have in common. Firstly, a capacity to
respond, in nonverbal ways, to both the experimental process and the wider laboratory
environment. Secondly, a capability to be cared for that spans across and between
species (although, as noted below, perhaps more readily between some species than
others). We argue that, while there are scientific and ethological reasons for some of
the differences in how human and animal subjects are treated in ethical protocols, the
current emphasis on what makes humans distinctive from other species (the ability to
speak) fails to engage with similarities in their care needsöor with the different kinds
of consent and cooperation care practices foster during the experimental process. In
this section we suggest how experimental research frameworks (working with either
human and/or nonhuman subjects) could be reconfigured and enhanced through an
emphasis on care-relating, consent, and cooperation articulated through bodily com-
munications [as seen in the most progressive examples of animal welfare protocols
which incorporate the observation of animal behaviour and demeanour to signal their
emotional state (Wemelsfelder, 2007)]. Following Whatmore (1997), we argue for a
rejection of the rational, autonomous human subject as the key figure of ethical
concern and for its replacement with a `relational ethics' based not on universal or
normative codes but on a sense of shared culpability and connection. This move
requires new tools and competencies.
Until recently we would argue that the majority of ethical protocols, such as the
more formal ethical review processes and informed consent forms, have relied on
the practices of representation. Either individual research subjects represent themselves
through giving their `informed consent'or, more usually, experts capable of articulating
the `interests' of research subjects do so in the appropriate technical and procedural
language. However, if we are to pay attention to how ethics is done in practice with
sentient beings, then we also need to look beyond the dedicated spaces of the ethics
committee (and the responsibilities set out in the CRN competencies) to understand
how ethical practices and notions of care and responsibility infuse everyday experi-
mental practice. So far this is a familiar move to many of those who have critiqued
the informed consent procedure, drawing attention to how informed consent is rarely the
free and autonomous decision it was designed to be (Boulton and Parker, 2007; Dawson,
2003; Greenhough, 2007; Hoeyer, 2003). Here we wish to go further in emphasising how
consentöor at least cooperation with the experimental processömight be nonverbal (see
also Hoeyer, 2003) and dependent on the creation of environments where subjects
remain articulate in the broadest sense. This in turn places new kinds of obligations
on the experimenter to develop their competency in sensing the ways in which they and
their sentient subjects react to the experimental environmentöwhat Haraway (2008)
might term response-abilities.
For Haraway (2008) it is the capacity to respond (as opposed to the capacity to
express a reasoned argument through language), which is the starting point for an
ethicalöor at least mutually responsibleöengagement with an experimental subject.
For Haraway ethical practice involves not just getting informed or expert consent but
reading and responding to nonverbal cues and signals and ``cultivating [a] sensitivity to
[the] context'' (Thrift, 2003, page 94) in which the research subject is enacted. This then
asks the experimenter to adopt a disposition within experimental space that is able to
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are working. The political theorist Jane Bennett (2001, page 3) describes this as a kind
of comportment, an ethical generosity and sensitivity towards (an)other:
``Codes and criteria are an indispensable part of ethics, and they surely will not work
without a sense of obligation or subscription. But these last things are still not
sufficient to the enactment of ethical aspirations, which requires bodily movements
in space, mobilizations of heat and energy, a series of choreographed gestures,
an instinctive assemblage of affective propulsions.''(10)
This position echoes recent work in geography that emphasises the relationship
between motion and emotion (McCormack, 2003; Paterson, 2005). For example,
McCormack's account which fleshes out an empirical practice for developing a somatic
sensibility, for exchanging and responding to feelings and actions through the bodies of
sentient others. This work, along with other work that details intrabodily communica-
tions (Katz, 2000; Rudge, 2009), could indicate how to progress towards developing an
empirical practice for experimenters and ethical practitioners in both medical research
and geography.
Despret (2004) makes a similar argument to McCormack, but in her case she
explores the relations between animals and humansöor what she terms anthropo-
zoo-genetic practiceöemphasising how both researcher and researched are transformed
by a shared experimental encounter. Despret uses the example of students working with
laboratory rats and describes how the enthusiasm and care the students expressed when
working with their rats helped encourage the rats to cooperate with the experiment.
Furthermore, she suggests that:
``These emotional relations, made of expectations, faith, belief, trust, which link
each rat to each student, disclose the very essence of the practice: this is a practice
of domestication. As long as this practice proposes new ways to behave, new
identities, it transforms both the scientist and the rat .... The rat proposes to the
student while the student proposes to the rat a new manner of becoming together,
which provides new identities: rats giving to students the chance of `being a good
experimenter', students giving to their rats a chance to add new meanings to `being
with a human', a chance to disclose new forms of `being together''' (Despret, 2004,
page 122).
Despret's example echoes the accounts of animal welfare practice above in suggest-
ing that the quality of care received by the experimental subject can shape the quality
and validity of the experiment. Yet she also develops this through her insistence that
the two-way relationship between student and rat, researcher and researched, is not a
given. It is conditional upon the spaces and environment established by the protocols
and apparatus of the experiment. The maze experiment conducted by humans and
rats above allowed the rats a choice: they could either join in with the maze experi-
ment or resist, refuse to participate. This possibility of refusal is important, as by
refusing, or at least having the opportunity to refuse participation, the rats becomeö
in Despret's wordsöarticulate. They can refuse to answer the questions addressed to
them or even, through their resistance and behaviour, suggest new, more interesting
questions. While conventional wisdom claims that the difference between humans
and animals is a capacity to give `informed consent' (MRC, 2005, page 4), here the
capacity to consent, or at least to refuse participation, is something extended to
nonhuman subjects.
(10) The challenge is to train experimenters to be open to the emotional sensibilities of their
experimental subjects, an impulse that would run counter to the way in which objectivity is stressed
in current scientific research training.
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environment is designed for exploring the effects of depression in a Rhesus monkey.(11)
Here the environment and experiment are designed to make monkey both docile(12)
and depressed. However, by designing the experiment in this way, Despret argues, the
scientist effectively offers the monkey no chance of resisting this diagnosis: it renders
the monkey inarticulate. The monkey experiment, we might suggest, thereby reflects
more the nature of the experiment than the nature of the monkeyöor, as O'Hanlon
(2001) might suggest, unhappy monkeys also give bad data. Here we find echoes of
Stengers's (1997, page 17) recognition of how the social and material construction
of experimental space can render the subject of empirical investigation either articulate
or dumb by enabling or suppressing respectively their capacity to respond. Not to
allow our object/subjects to object or resist is to run the risk of effectively silencing
the object/subject of analysis and producing results that reflect the effects of the
experimental environment more than the effects of the substance, compound, or
medical treatment under study.
This notion of resistance has important and interesting parallels with the process of
giving consent to participate in an experiment. Just as good clinical trial practice
requires volunteers to cooperate in the experiment, so do good laboratory students
need the rats with whom they are working to participate cooperatively in the making of
the experiment. However, there are two important distinctions between the abstract
ideal of `informed consent' and the kind of embodied cooperation described by
Despret. Firstly, while informed consent is dependent on language, embodied cooper-
ation can also be nonverbal (through, for example, relaxing enough to allow blood to
be drawn) and demands instead a degree of somatic sensibility and emotional sensi-
tivityöDespret (2004) calls it trustöbetween the researcher and researched.(13)
Secondly, while informed consent requires a formal procedure, and usually a signature,
the development of somatic sensibilities requires a particular kind of spaceöor
contextöand an experimental design that allows the research subject to articulate.
For example, to be able to express nonverbal consentöa kind of bodily complianceö
through a more relaxed demeanour. At the same time it is important to remain aware
that the capacity to refuse participation by not giving consent (whether verbal or
nonverbal) is more limited for some species than others (humans are usually more
able to refuse participation than other species) and for some more vulnerable (14) human
subjects than others. In the final sections, we will now turn to ask what this attention
to more-than-representational (Lorimer, 2005) ethics might offer both scientific and
social science researchers, as well as noting some of the limitations of this approach.
(11) Here Despret is referring to the primatologist Harlow's experiments separating newborn mon-
keys from their mothers and peers. The newborns, isolated in cages for months, developed
pathological and self-destructive behaviour, despair, and very deep depression according to Harlow
(Despret, 2004, note 10; see also Harlow, 1964).
(12) It is perhaps interesting to note here that one of Fisher's (2006) concerns with the informed
consent process within human clinical trials is that from the perspective of trial organisers the
informed consent process serves to render research participants more compliant with trial protocols
and less inclined to withdraw from the trial.
(13) This is not to say talk is unimportant for relations between nurses and their human subjects.
Indeed it can play a key role in building relations of trust (Fisher, 2006), but this kind of inter-
personal communication is distinct from the abstract notion of a rational actor making an
autonomous decision to consent.
(14) Here vulnerable human subjects may include both those subjects judged not capable of giving
informed consent (eg those deemed mentally incapacitated), and those subjects whose economic
circumstances may force them to make choices (for financial or other rewards) they would rather
not have to (Rajan, 2007).
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Shifting from a focus on the capacity to consent to the recognition of an affective
capacity to respond, and from knowing at a distance to caring, marks a starting point
for considering what different kinds of experimental subjects might have in common.
Despite the persistence of techniques that differentiate humans and animals, there are
a number of experiences and issues, shared by all kinds of experimental subjects, where
the human^animal distinction appears less profound. After all, it is their bodily
similarities, or shared responses, which form the primary justification for using animal
models in research on human medicines in the first place. These include the welfare
needs of sentient beings; consensual experiences of being an embodied experimental
subject; and physiological similarities between human and human, human and animal,
animal and animal, and researcher and researched. As Anderson and Harrison (2006,
page 334) suggest, paying attention to the affective and emotional dimensions of a
relationship allows other understandings of subjectivity to emerge:
``[It] should lead to questions over the emergence of subjectivities from more or
less unwilled affectual and emotional assemblages and the consequences of such
questions for reflexivity, responsibility, intentionality, autonomy and identity.''
More than 200 years ago it was recognised that in practice the seemingly neat
distinction between a rational, informed, autonomous human subject who can give
consent to an experimental procedure and a `dumb animal' that cannot/can be hard
to sustain. As Bentham noted, ``The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they
talk? But, Can they suffer?'' (1789, page 283). From this perspective the notion of
nonverbal consentöor cooperationöopens up an interesting possibility. Perhaps the
key question is not `Can they give informed consent?', but do they have an opportunity
to resist or contest their enrolment and treatment (being objectified) in the experimen-
tal process. Such a question is immediately sensitive to the differences between the
research conditions of human and animal subjects: humans can ultimately refuse to
participate while animals may be forced to participate, however much they try and
resist. At the same time, though, it also emphasises the blurriness of this boundary,
in the form of human subjects who, due to economic and social circumstances, for
example, may feel they have little choice but to consent (Rajan, 2007).
Current animal and human trial regulations and procedures for the testing of new
pharmaceutical products construct the response-abilities (capacities to respond and to
take responsibility) and forms of their experimental subjects in different ways, most
strongly marked in the distinction between humans and other species. For humans
their capacity to respond is bisected into two distinct moments. Firstly, the situation
whereby a patient-subject is recruited and engaged in the rational, reasoned, and
language-based process of completing an informed consent form, who may, contra-
Mol's (2008) citizen, be asked about his or her bodily well-being. Secondly, the moment
when the patient's responses are measured as a part of the clinical trial. One focuses on
the patient as a subject (including a concern for his or her welfare and comfort); the
other, more on the patient as scientific research object (where his or her discomfort also
marks a significant scientific finding). In contrast, in animal research both the animals'
welfare as subjects and their responses as objects are measured in nonverbal ways
during the experimental process. Laboratory animal welfare assessment procedures
(Leach and Main, 2008) find ways of extending physiological observations of the animal
to include a wider remit of animals' nonverbal responses to an experimentöfor exam-
ple, where it moves and how it moves, its appearance, its behaviour, its vocalisations.
This leads to the question of how far contemporary human clinical practices
and protocols, and the experimental environments and relations they inscribe, allow
patients the capacity for somatic expression and resistance and allow nurses to conduct
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practice. If we understand nursing as a bricoleur activity (Gobbi, 2005) that involves
the development of somatic sensibilities, we might ask how far current experimental
environments create opportunities for these sensibilities to be registered and responded
to with care practices.This can be expressed as two emerging research questions. Firstly,
what forms of response and interaction between experimental subjects and their
wider environments can be seen to exceed contemporary ethical protocols and codes?
Secondly, can we make spaces that allow experimental subjects and their experimenters
to interact and respond to each other differentlyöin other words, spaces that are
open to how intra-acting (Barad, 2007) bodies shape ethical sensibilities (see also Popke,
2009, page 84)? These questions could stimulate new directions in debates within
bioethics and the social study of clinical trial practice. This has particular implications
for how we work with those deemed incapable of giving informed consent, including
babies, children, and those mentally incapacitated, who may be capable of articulating
somatically signs of cooperation or dissent, distress, and discomfort. Calarco (2008,
pages 131^132) suggests that these groups occupy ``a similar space of marginalization
alongside animals''. For these subjects, recognition of `nonverbal'consent could play as
important a role in ensuring ethical practice as critical anthropomorphism and animal
welfare protocols do in animal experimentation.
An attention to somatic sensibilities also has something to offer for geographical
research and practice. We argue that work in animal welfare, animal philosophy, and
nursing research can offer further empirical and philosophical grounding for thinking
through how emotion and affect can intervene in and condition the experimental
process. Furthermore we suggest this work also offers ways of developing the kinds of
skills and competencies needed to incorporate practices of care in geographical knowl-
edge practices (Dewsbury and Naylor, 2002) and to develop research environments
which enable both researcher and researched to articulate and respond.
Of course, equally there is a need to recognise the limitations of this approach. The
recognition of somatic sensibilities in and of itself does not serve as a basis for
generating the normative values that might inform the development of ethical proce-
dures. Rather we suggest that an ethics derived from somatic sensibilities might be
used to complement and extend existing ethical practices. To help guide such a devel-
opment, we will conclude by identifying six emerging problems and areas for further
research.
Firstly, to share suffering is arguably not the same as sharing the meanings and
utilitarian ethical values that underpin choices to suffer, or not. In other words,
somatic sensibilities begin from a place quite different from contemporary ethical
norms that emerge from a utilitarian position (Singer, 2002) wherein the costs of
animal or human suffering are weighed against the benefits of the research to (human)
society as a whole. Therefore, installing a new ethical operation of somatic sensibilities
will rub up against and conflict with previous norms. But this does not mean that this
is an approach with no practical value. Sharing suffering can provide the basis for
improved experimental design. For example, `choice tests' usually used to assess living
conditions may be adapted to also take account of the expressed need for analgesics,
as was recently explored by research in farm-animal welfare (Danbury et al, 2000;
see also Dawkins, 2006).
Secondly, the focus on the relationship between individual subjects (patient^nurse,
lab animal^animal caretaker) leaves open the issue of how far this approach could
contribute to a more generalised social awareness of, and ethical sensibilities towards,
the many experimental subjects. As Popke (2009, page 84) suggests, perhaps here
as in other nonrepresentational approaches to ethics, we are at risk of emphasising
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collective responsibility'', a shortcoming also of the `choice-tests' used to ask what the
animal wants in animal welfare science.
Thirdly, there is the inherent risk of instrumentalism, a problem already seen in
some areas of animal welfare science. At the point of application, the ideals of the
welfarist position and the process of observing and responding to animal suffering can
be reduced to a list of tick-box procedures. Such processes go through the ethical
motions, so to speak, without engaging in the kind of affective relations that might
underpin a sustained ethical reflection and sensibility [a move also echoed by the
training nurses receive in informed consent procedures; see Fisher (2006)]. If there
were a normative commitment here, we would suggest it is found in a commitment
to leaving space within experimental designs to allow a nurse or animal technician to
respond to `unfinished matters' (Hinchliffe, 2007, page 139)öto acknowledge the
capacity for the subject to object, contest and resist, or comply with the experimental
process (as Despret's rats were able to do). However, more work is needed to map out
more fully the passage between a procedural commitment to the development
of somatic sensibilities and a wider social debate about the implications these new
relations and insights may have in public policies on human and animal research.
Fourthly, this highlights how the development of somatic sensibilities is limited
by, and dependent on, our abilities to forge connections and understandings across
species and cultural boundaries. It is notable that most of our discussions above focus
on warm-blooded mammals. Arguments for the development of companionable rela-
tions (Haraway, 2008) and somatic sensibilities are arguably easier to envision with
respect to charismatic animals (Lorimer, 2007) that are big-like-us (Hird, 2010) than it
is to imagine empathising with mosquitoes (Beisel, 2010), microbes (Hird, 2009), or
plants (Keller, 1984). This means we need to pay attention to the category animal in our
discussions. As we noted above, the skills animal lab technicians develop in somatic
sensibility are arguably species specific.
Fifthly, there are the specific geographies of the ethical encounters we described,
which can play a key role in shaping the development of ethical relations (Greenhough,
2007; Jones, 2000; Whatmore, 1997). Our focus on laboratory spaces leaves open the
question, as noted above, of how this context and species-specific form of relating
might compare to other spaces of human^animal encounter.(15) Recent work on
human^nonhuman relations at other sites suggests that somatic sensibilities are also
at work in the practices of field biology (Kohler, 2002), conservation (Hinchliffe et al,
2005), conservation science (Lorimer, 2008a), political debate (Bingham, 2006), and
reindeer herding (Lorimer, 2006).
Finally, there also remains an implicit emphasis within the concept of somatic
sensibility on proximity (being within touching distance) as central to the recognition
of and engagement with somatic sensibilities. While this allows scope to explore how
particular environments and modes of encounter create and constrain the development
of somatic sensibilities, it fails to address the question of how these kinds of sensibil-
ities might operate at a distance. Work on ethical consumption (Barnett et al, 2002)
and notions of responsibility across distance (Clark, 2005; Clark et al, 2005) suggest
a need to explore how far, if at all, somatic sensibilities might be engaged at a distance
through mediated forms of encounter. This might include the kinds of empathy
evoked through moving imagery, which is only just beginning to be explored within
the geographical literature (J Lorimer, 2008b). Or the scientific practices that signal
(15) As scholars of science studies have noted, the scientific and geographical practices of human^
animal relations are likely to change significantly as we move between laboratory and field
(Burkhardt, 1999; Kohler, 2002; see also Dewsbury and Naylor, 2002).
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on industrial meat-cutting lines (Roe, 2010). Emphasising proximate and immediate
relations also obscures historical and temporal dimensions of animal research, and
the underlying power relations they inscribe (Birke et al, 2007; Franklin, 2007). While
developing somatic sensibility can arguably improve the welfare of experimental sub-
jects, it is less helpful in engaging with the histories that have resulted in a medical
industry dependent on the use of animal subjects as the assayers of our medical inno-
vations.(16) We need to recognise that ``our affective encounters seldom take place in a
space free from the exigencies of the real social relations and emotional investments
that inflect our ethical orientations and influence our opportunities'' (Popke, 2009,
page 86). Further exploration of somatic sensibilities might take up the challenge of
how those sense-abilities operate across different value systems, species, and spaces.
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